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The Player and the Dice:
Physics and Critical Legal Theory
"God does not play at dice."
-Albert Einstein1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the middle to late 1970s a movement arose within legal studies that
developed a critique of traditional legal scholarship. 2 The new movement has
become known as Critical Legal Studies (CLS). 3 A huge body of literature has
grown around CLS and critiques of CLS tenets. The CLS school is difficult to
characterize, partly because of the differences in philosophy among critical
legal scholars (CRITs) themselves. 4 However, CLS can probably best be
described as a legal studies movement that attempts to show how the principles
of traditional legal scholarship have served to justify domination and privilege,
while embracing an epistemology that claims neutrality and predictability. 5 It is
not surprising, therefore, that the movement disturbs and even alarms the
mainstream of legal scholarship.
One commentator has suggested that the philosophical underpinnings of the
CLS movement can be traced to the revolution in physics that occurred early in
the twentieth century. 6 Physics in the early twentieth century, particularly the
work of Albert Einstein and Werner Heisenberg, altered the deterministic
I This famous quotation of Einstein's arose from his inability to accept the
indeterminism of quantum mechanics as developed by Heisenberg and others. Einstein
made the remark so often that Niels Bohr finally retorted. See infra note 145 and
accompanying quotation. See also J. BRONOWSKI, THE ASCENT OF MAN 256 (1973).
2 See generally Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 Omo ST. L.J.
599, 614 (1989).
3 Critical Legal Studies is named for a loose network of legal scholars formed in 1977
called the Conference on Critical Legal Studies. For a sampling of CLS views see Frug,
7he Oty as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980); Gabel & Kennedy, Roll over
Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 209 (1979); Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes
and Cure, 90 YALE L.J 1205 (1981). These works have a distinctly irrationalist flavor. See
infra notes 11 & 18 and accompanying text.
4 Minda, supra note 2, at 615.
5 Id. at 615-17; Minnow, Law Turning Outvard, 73 TELOS 79, 83 (1986).
6 Williams, Critical Legal Studies: 7he Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the
New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 436-39 (1987); see also Chow, Trashing N'hilism,
65 TUL. L. REv. 221, 242-43 (1990).
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world-view of Newtonian physics. 7 This set in motion a revolution in thinking
in a number of fields, including philosophy and literature.8 At least one
commentator sees CLS as the attempt to incorporate this "new epistemology"
into legal scholarship as well. 9
The purpose of this Note is to compare the discoveries of twentieth-century
physics with the law. The topic of science and the law is vast, and will not be
dealt with in its entirety; instead, a few aspects of modem physics will be
explored in the context of the ideas of Critical Legal Studies. 10 Several aspects
of modem physics are ignored by CLS and other branches of the new
epistemology. These factors will be examined and their implications for CLS
discussed. It is not suggested here that a strict scientific analogy for the law is
valid. The comparison of physics and CLS is made for two reasons. First, the
comparison shows that CLS is not consistent with its philosophical origins in
the physics of the early twentieth century. Second, the findings of physics,
though not forming a strict analogy, are useful in exploring some aspects of the
law in the context of CLS ideas. The hope is that CLS and legal studies in
general might benefit by comparison, not with the epistemology as filtered
through the lenses of philosophy and linguistics, but directly with the scientific
findings themselves.
In Part II of this Note, the basic arguments and tenets of CLS will be
described. This description will necessarily be only an outline; the great
diversity of views within CLS is a limiting factor. The ideas that are discussed
in Part II are taken to a large extent from a paper by Joseph Singer.I' Singer's
paper was chosen to represent the views of CLS because his ideas are explained
in clear language, because the ideas he presents are similar to those discussed
by other CRITs, and because he is a representative of the "irrationalists."
Irrationalists are the group within CLS who reject most vehemently the ideas of
traditional legal theory and even legal realism. Thus, irrationalists represent
most closely the legal manifestation of the second wave of the new
epistemology. 12
7 See Chow, supra note 6, at 242 n.81; Williams, supra note 6, at 437-39. See also J.
BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 221-25; S. HAwKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 55
(1988).
8 Chow, supra note 6, at 243-46; Williams, supra note 6, at 449-69.
9 The term "new epistemology" is one used by Williams; see Williams, supra note 6,
at 430.
10 For a detailed discussion of the scientific model of the law, see Note, The Scientific
Model in Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1967 (1987).
11 Singer, The Player and the Cards. Nihilism and Legal 77teory, 94 YALE L.J. 1
(1984).
12 See Williams, supra note 6, at 488-91 for discussions of the new epistemology and
its influence on legal realism and CLS.
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In Part mII, the philosophical background of the new epistemology,
culminating in its incorporation into CLS theory, is briefly outlined.13 In Part
IV, a comparison is made of the findings of modem physics and the ideas of
the new epistemology and CLS. An analysis of the law by way of analogy with
modem physics is proposed.
I. CRITcAL LEGAL STUDIES
CLS is difficult to characterize because it consists of a loosely connected
group of scholars with widely diverse views.14 There have been, however,
attempts to describe a central philosophy to the CLS movement. 15 In a phrase,
CLS is legal atheism; the central tenet of CLS is that there is no absolute or
transcendental source for the law. Rather, the law varies according to time and
place, and is not neutral, objective, or deterministic. 16 In addition, according to
CLS, legal reasoning serves to justify and promote domination and rigid
hierarchy by those in power. 17 Joseph Singer claims that traditional legal
theory has three basic tenets that are susceptible to critique: Determinacy,
objectivity, and neutrality. The CLS critique, as articulated mainly by Singer,
will be described briefly below.
A. Detenninacy
Determinacy, when used by Singer and other CRITs, refers to the idea that
laws determine the outcome of conflicts. 18 A legal rule is deterministic if it
"tells us what to do"; in the extreme, complete determinacy leaves us no choice
at all. 19 Indeterminacy, on the other hand, allows choice in the outcome of
conflicts. Singer claims that laws are far more indeterminate than traditional
legal theorists ("liberals" in CRIT terminology) claim. 20 Traditional judges,
therefore, can claim determinacy, but use legal reasoning to justify a desired
outcome. In effect, the judge is saying, "I can't help it, the law dictates what
13 For a complete discussion of the new epistemology and the role of CLS, see id.
14 See Chow, supra note 6, at 223; Ewald, Unger's Philosophy: A Critical Legal
Study, 97 YALE L.J. 665, 668 (1988); Minda, supra note 2, at 615.
15 See Minda, supra note 2, at 615-18; Minnow, supra note 5, at 83.
16 Singer, supra note 11, at 9.
17 Chow, supra note 6, at 227; Ewald, supra note 14, at 669.
18 The ideas for the next section are taken to a large extent from a paper by Joseph
Singer. See generally Singer, supra note 11. See also Williams, supra note 6, for
discussions of the new epistemology, and its influence on legal realism and CLS.
19 Singer, supra note 11, at 11.
20 Id. at 14.
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the outcome will be." In fact, the judge is making a decision based on his own
view of a just outcome.21
Singer does not assert that "liberal" scholars claim complete determinacy;
only that "liberals" claim choices are severely constrained. 22 Traditional legal
theory, in Singer's view, incorporates both determinacy and indeterminacy
with a large amount of determinacy as a premise for the rule of law.23 The
CLS critique of the traditional theory is that, in fact, law is extremely
indeterminate: "If traditional legal theorists are correct about the importance of
determinacy to the rule of law, then-by their own criteria-the rule of law has
never existed anywhere." 24
The process used by CRITs to challenge "liberal" theorists is called
"internal critique" or "trashing." 25 CLS claims to criticize traditionalists from
within by using the premise of traditional theory against itself.26 For instance,
Joseph Singer uses internal critique to point out that legal doctrine is not
deterministic. 27 He does this by asserting that a legal theory must be
comprehensive, consistent, directive, and self-revising in order to be fully
deterministic. Because each of these qualities is not fully realized in traditional
legal theory, traditional legal theory is therefore not deterministic. 28
CRITs believe that law is directed not by deterministic rules, but entirely
by politics.29 The legal reasoning and theories used by judges are, in fact, only
justifications for decisions based on the judges' political views or cultural
surroundings. 30
B. Objectivity
Objectivity is the assertion that the truth or falsity of a moral, political, or
legal view can be demonstrated by rational argument.31 Singer and other
CRITs reject this idea because they feel that moral, political, and legal views
are not based on rational argument, but on personal experience and emotion. 32
Singer thus attacks not only the determinacy of legal rules, but the
foundation or legitimacy of the rules. The traditional theories of positivism and
natural law are based on an outside "source" for the law. In positivism, it is the
21 Id.
22 Id. at 13-14.
23 Id. at 14.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 10; Chow, supra note 6, at 227.
26 Singer, supra note 11, at 10.
27 Id. at 14-25.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 22-25.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 25.
3 2 Id. at 25-39.
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sovereign that is the source of all law. Natural law is based on a transcendent
source for the law, such as nature or God.33 Singer rejects the view that legal
rules are legitimate if they accurately represent some external source. 34 Because
the foundation for most traditional legal thought cannot be described with
sufficient accuracy to provide an objective basis for moral or political
conviction, it cannot tell us what to do. 35 Singer contends that moral, political,
and legal views are not a matter of rational or objective reasoning leading to a
demonstrable truth. Instead, they are the result of individual experience and
emotion which leads to moral conviction. 36
C. Neutrality
Singer attacks the idea that one of the important goals of the law should be
neutrality.37 According to CLS, neutrality is the traditional view that
individuals should be allowed their own concept of freedom and the good life,
and that limits to this freedom should be based on principles of justice that are
independent of judges' own visions of these ideals. 38 Singer maintains that this
view is itself nonneutral and political because it is opposed to views that do not
recognize individuality. 39
A central theme of CLS is to reveal how traditional legal analysis and
doctrine do not serve to promote justice, equality, and the good life. Instead,
traditional analysis justifies the status quo and gives legitimacy to hierarchies of
race, gender, and class.40 Supposedly neutral legal principles actually
legitimize those in power instead of creating a truly democratic society. In
order to uncover the hidden assumptions of traditional legal analysis, some
CRJTs describe traditional doctrines in terms of a "narrative" or "story." 41
The narrative is said to reflect underlying ideological and political bias. "For
example, women and racial minorities within CLS have shown how law can be
understood as a political discourse of power contextualized within a social and
legal description established by white male discourse." 42 In the CRYTs' view,
those in power claim that the law is neutral, so that when the law continues to
33 Id. at 27.
3 4 1d. at 29.
35 Id. at 30-38.
36 Id. at 38-39.
3 7 Id. at 40-47.
38 Id. at 40.
39 Id. at41.
40 Minda, supra note 2, at 617.
41 Id. at 616. Although Singer does not discuss narrative in his paper, it is an important
part of the CLS critique of neutrality and is therefore included here.4 2 Id. at 617.
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reinforce their position of dominance, legitimacy for that position can be
asserted.
D. Destinations
One of the most common criticisms of CLS is that CRITs suggest no clear
alternative to the rule of law.43 CRITs are divided on what to do about the law
after demonstrating its illegitimacy. Some, known as "rationalists" or
"northerners," attempt to reconstruct legal doctrine and provide a new rational
basis for law.44 The "irrationalists" or "southerners" argue that reconstruction
is futile because all attempts to provide a normative basis for law are subject to
the same critiques as "liberal" legal doctrine. 45 Irrationalists such as Joseph
Singer would, therefore, completely give up legal reasoning as a basis for
deciding what to do about human conflict. 46 He contends that difficult moral
decisions should be made, not by rational formulae, but by having
"conversations" and engaging in the "joint reconstruction of social life." 47
Decisionmakers, according to Singer, should examine society's values and
make choices based on the likely consequences of various alternatives. 48 His
social vision is to "prevent cruelty," "alleviate misery," and "alter social
conditions that cause loneliness." 49
III. THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND FOR CLS
Joan Williams has suggested that CLS has its philosophical roots in the
"new epistemology" of the twentieth century. 50 The new epistemology,
according to Williams, can be traced to the revolution in mathematics and
physics in the latter part of the nineteenth century and early part of the
twentieth century. 51 The revolution in physics had a profound effect on a large
number of fields, including literary criticism, philosophy, linguistics, the visual
arts, and now law. 52
43 See, e.g., Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REV. 247,
260 (1984) ("Critical legal writing systematically evades the question, 'Compared to
what?'"), cited in Minda, supra note 2, at 615.
44 Mnda, supra note 2, at 619-20.
45 Id. at 620.
46 Singer, supra note 11, at 57.
47 See generally Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1276, 1386 (1984); Singer, supra note 11, at 66.
48 Singer, supra note 11, at 65-66.
49 Id. at 66-70.
50 Williams, supra note 6, at 431.
51 Id. at 436-39.
5 2 Id. at 436-91.
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This section will briefly outline the development of the new epistemology
from its scientific roots through its philosophic and linguistic effects to its
influence on the law.53 The emphasis will be on the scientific revolution itself.
A. The Scientific Background
Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, the discoveries of science,
and particularly physics, were thought to correspond to a transcendental and
purely objective reality.54 The ideas of Newton described the motion of solid
bodies with precision and predictability. The Marquis de Laplace went so far as
to suggest that a set of scientific laws could be discovered that would allow
prediction of everything in the universe.55 Determinism was the standard
assumption of science until the turn of the century.
A number of important developments in physics occurred around the turn
of the century that challenged the concept of determinism. These developments
were the basis for a revolution in physics that captured the imagination not only
of scientists, but of society at large. Three major lines of work make up the
revolution: The structure of the atom, Einsteinian relativity, and quantum
mechanics. Each of these is discussed below.
1. The Structure of the Atom
Philosophers and scientists have argued about the fundamental nature of
matter since the time of Aristotle.5 6 Aristotle believed that matter was
inherently homogenous; matter could be divided into smaller and smaller pieces
without limit. Another Greek, Democritus, thought that matter was grainy, and
that at a certain point matter could no longer be divided without changing its
inherent nature. 57 Democritus called the indivisible piece or building block of
matter the atom. Some evidence was presented in the nineteenth century that
matter was indeed made of different types of particles, but it was not until the
early twentieth century that the argument was finally settled.58 The work of a
number of scientists showed that matter was made of particles, and that these
particles had internal structure.
53 The reader is directed to Williams' comprehensive review of the subject for more
detail. See generally id. at 436-69.54 1d. at 436.
55 S. HAWKING, supra note 7, at 53.
56 Id. at 64. See also Heisenberg, Planck's Discovery and the Philosophical Problems
in Nuclear Physics, in SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 108 (Valvoulis & Colver ed. 1966).
57 Heisenberg, supra note 56, at 108.
58 S. HAWKING, supra note 7, at 64.
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In 1911, by colliding alpha-particles with matter, Ernest Rutherford
demonstrated that atoms have internal structure.59 The inner part of the atom
forms a positively charged nucleus, and negatively charged electrons form an
outer part. Electrons were first thought to "orbit" the nucleus as planets orbit
the sun. The problem with this model is that electrons would spiral into the
nucleus, causing all matter to collapse rapidly.60 In 1913, Niels Bohr suggested
that the electrons could be found only at certain distances from the nucleus,
known as "orbitals." Each orbital corresponds to a particular energy level.
Only one or two electrons can occupy any one orbital, and thus an electron can
collapse toward the nucleus only until it fills one of the lower energy orbitals. 61
More recently, scientists have discovered that the protons and neutrons, which
make up the nucleus, are themselves not fundamental, but are made of smaller
particles called quarks. 62 One of the important implications of these discoveries
(together with those of quantum mechanics) is that the nature of matter depends
on the scale at which one studies it. That is, matter behaves one way on the
macroscopic level, and another on a sub-microscopic level. 63
2. Relativity
The Aristotelian concept of the behavior of physical bodies was that they
had a state of preferred or absolute rest.64 Galileo and Newton showed that
there is no absolute standard of rest. One cannot tell if object A is at rest and
object B is moving, or if object B is at rest and object A is moving. 65 In the
Newtonian universe, therefore, movement of any object had to be measured
relative to some other object. In both the Aristotelian and Newtonian worlds,
however, time was absolute.66
In the 1860s, James Clerk Maxwell succeeded in developing a theory for
the propagation of light and other electromagnetic radiation.67 This theory
predicted that light should travel at a fixed speed, but Newton's laws required
that speed be measured relative to something. It was suggested that there
existed an "ether" through which light waves travel, just as sound waves travel
through air. 68 Observers would measure the speed of light differently
59 Id.; J. BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 334.
60 . BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 334; S. HAWKING, supra note 7, at 59.
61 J. BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 336; S. HAWKING, supra note 7, at 59.
62 F. CAPRA, THE TAO OF PHYSICS 242-43 (2d ed. 1984); S. HAWKING, supra note
7, at 65.
63 See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
64 S. HAWKING, supra note 7, at 15.
65 Id. at 17.
66 Id. at 18.
6 7 Id. at 19.
68 Id.
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depending on their position and speed relative to the light, but the light would
always travel at a constant speed relative to the ether.
In 1887, the famous Michelson-Morley experiment contradicted the idea of
an ether through which electromagnetic waves move. The experiment showed
that the speed of light was the same no matter what the position and speed of
the observer.69 In 1905, Albert Einstein and Henri Poincare suggested a
solution to the problems raised by the Michelson-Morley experiment. They
asserted that if the idea of absolute time is abandoned, there is no need for the
concept of an ether.
The theory of relativity proposes that the laws of science are the same for
all freely moving observers. All observers measure the same speed of light, no
matter how fast the observer is moving.70 This revolutionized ideas of space
and time. Because the speed of light is the same for all observers, time and
distance must be relative. Observers moving at different velocities relative to an
event measure different times passing for the same event. This effect is not
"just in the minds" of the observers; identical clocks carried by two observers
record different amounts of time passing.71 Sometimes this phenomenon is
called the "paradox of the watch" or the "twin paradox." If one of a set of
identical twins goes on a journey at high speed, he will return younger than his
brother. In addition, his watch will have recorded less time than his
brother's. 72
3. Quantum Mechanics
In 1900, Max Planck found that electromagnetic radiation is emitted as
quanta, or finite packets of energy, rather than as a smooth continuum of
energy predicted by the wave model. 73 This was the first modem indication
that electromagnetic energy could be thought of as particles, rather than waves.
The implications of Planck's quantum theory of light were not completely
understood until Werner Heisenberg developed the uncertainty principle in
1926. 74 The uncertainty principle has to do with measurement of the position
and velocity of a sub-atomic particle. Measuring such a particle requires
shining light on it and measuring the scatter of the light as it hits the particle.
Because the particle is small, a very short wavelength of light must be used to
measure it. A long wavelength cannot be used, because the distance between
69 j. BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 247; S. HAWKING, supra note 7, at 20.
70 J. BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 248; S. HAWKING, supra note 7, at 20.
71 For an excellent explanation of Einstein's remarkably simple illustrations of this
phenomenon, see J. BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 247-52. See also S. HAWKING, supra
note 7, at 20-21.
72 Heisenberg, supra note 56, at 109; J. BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 255.
73 J. BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 336; S. HAWKING, supra note 7, at 54.
74 J. BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 364-65; S. HAwKING, supra note 7, at 54.
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the trough and crest of the wave becomes larger than the size of the particle.
The light would "miss" the particle-not hit it at all. However, the shorter the
wavelength of light, the higher the energy a single quantum of light must have.
Because the particle must be hit with at least one quantum and that quantum is
high energy, it will interact with the particle and alter its velocity. The more
accurately the position of the particle is measured, the less accurately its
velocity can be determined and vice-versa. There is a finite limit at which this
uncertainty exists, and it is a fundamental property of the universe. The particle
cannot be measured with more accuracy than this limit allows.75
An important consequence of the uncertainty principle is the inability to
describe sub-atomic particles using conventional Newtonian language. Rather
than positions and velocities, sub-atomic particles are now said to have
"quantum states." 76 Quantum mechanics is the theory developed by
Heisenberg, Schrdinger, and Dirac to explain the quantum states of particles.
Quantum mechanics requires a reconciliation between waves and particles;
sometimes it is helpful to think of particles as waves, and sometimes it is
helpful to think of waves as particles. In addition, rather than predicting a
single, deterministic outcome for any event involving particles, quantum
mechanics predicts a number of possible results. It is impossible to tell whether
any particular particle will end in any given outcome, but it is possible to say
how many out of a number of particles will end in a particular outcome.77
B. Philosophical Assimilation
The philosophical movement known as logical positivism resulted from a
rejection of the old, transcendental way of thinking, based at least in part on the
findings of physics in the early twentieth century.78 Logical positivism is
identified by Williams as the "first wave" of the new epistemology. Theories,
according to the logical positivists, do not describe any kind of objective reality
without experimentally verified facts. 79
The assimilation of this first-wave epistemology in the law was legal
realism. 80 Legal realists reject the classical idea of judicial decisionmaking: that
judges apply doctrine in an abstract, "scientific" way and logically deduce the
correct answer. Instead, legal realists assert that legal doctrine, like scientific
theory, is not representative of reality. Only a study of what a judge actually
75 S. HAWKING, supra note 7, at 54-55 (Hawking's explanation of the uncertainty
principle).
7 6 Id. at 55.
77 Id. Einstein was uncomfortable with this idea, see, e.g., supra note 1.
78 Williams, supra note 6, at 439-40.
7 9 Id. at 440 (quoting E. PURCELL, THE CRisIs OF DEMocRAcY 48 (1973)).
80 Id. at 442.
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does is relevant to understanding the legal system.81 Similarly, legal realists
advocate study of the actual, practical effects of law on people, rather than
study of legal theories.82
Based in part on relativity theory and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle,
a "second wave" of the new epistemology questioned not only the
transcendental aspects of theories, but also the facts themselves.8 3 Second-wave
thinkers took relativity to stand for the idea that the "facts" of an event depend
entirely on the observer's point of view. Similarly, the uncertainty principle has
been translated into a popular notion that by the very act of observing, the
object or event observed is altered. Therefore, second-wave thinkers believe
that discovery of any "true" facts becomes impossible. The facts themselves
are an artifact of the observer's point of view.84
These ideas have had profound effects on Western intellectual thought in
the twentieth century. 85 In particular, linguists have pointed out that human
perceptions are filtered through the language and culture of the particular
person involved. 86 The Platonic idea of "ideal forms," 87 which had resulted in
a "picture theory" for language, is rejected by modem linguists. 88 Categories
of language thought to correspond to universal concepts were shown to be
artifacts of Western thought not shared by other cultures. These ideas are
bolstered by the physicists' assertions that ordinary language is inadequate to
the task of describing sub-atomic phenomena. Modem linguists assert, in turn,
that human beings have no access to objective facts. 89 According to Williams,
CLS is the response in legal studies to the second wave of the new
epistemology. 90
IV. COMPARISONS
"At the center of the CLS universe is a straw man: the liberal committed to
the picture theory who is oblivious to physics since Einstein and to philosophy
since Kant, and who believes that law when objectively applied by a neutral
judge, gives correct answers in specific cases." 91
81 Id. at 443.
82 An example of this is law and social science; see, e.g., Schlegel, American Legal
Realism and Empirical Social Science. From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REV.
459 (1979).
83 Williams, supra note 6, at 445.
84Id.
85 Id. at 445-69.
86 Id.
87 Heisenberg, supra note 56, at 108.
88 Williams, supra note 6, at 446.
89 Id. at 447.
90 1d. at 430.
91 Id. at 485-86.
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Nihilist CRITs, such as Joseph Singer, maintain that legal process is
essentially illegitimate because it is impossible to ground the legal system in a
rational foundation. 92 If CLS is indeed the product of an epistemology based on
the scientific revolution of the early twentieth century, it follows that relativity
and quantum mechanics should have rendered the process of science
illegitimate, and any attempt to ground science on a rational basis futile. Rather
than abandoning rationality, however, physics as well as other branches of
science have flourished since the early twentieth century.
Why is this so? Are scientists poor deluded "liberals" who persist in
continuing a project that is essentially doomed? Do physicists themselves not
understand the true impact of their own discoveries and refuse to believe, for
instance, the uncertainty principle? The answer must be no. After all, physicists
explained relativity and quantum mechanics to the rest of us; it is inconceivable
that they do not understand the implications of their own theories. Science in
the modem age must remain useful in some way, or scientists would not pursue
it. Is it possible that the legal process also remains useful after CLS?
The purpose of this section is to compare CLS and the new epistemology
directly with science itself. It is not suggested that a perfect analogy exists
between science and the law. Instead, the scientific findings are explored to
show that CLS, and new epistemology in general, is inconsistent with its
philosophical roots in early twentieth-century physics. In addition, the scientific
findings are useful in exploring some aspects of the law, even though a strict
analogy does not exist. The comparison will be done in three stages. First, the
actual findings and implications of the revolution in physics will be compared
with counterparts found in the new epistemology. Second, three aspects of
modem science that are often overlooked by the new epistemology will be
discussed. These are characterized as scale, tolerance, and process. Finally,
legal process and CLS will be discussed in light of the findings of twentieth-
century physics.
A. The Science Itself
1. Quantwn Mechanics and the Uncertainty Principle
Several ideas of quantum mechanics have fired the imaginations of
philosophers and others outside of science. 93 Two aspects of quantum theory
are particularly important to the understanding of the new epistemology. 94
Quantum theory redefines sub-atomic matter. Sub-atomic matter is no longer
thought of strictly as particles, but sometimes as particles and sometimes as
92 See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
93 Williams, supra note 6, at 438-39.
94 Id.
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waves. 95 The change is required because neither the behavior of macroscopic
bodies, nor the behavior of waves can adequately explain the behavior of sub-
atomic matter. This is sometimes characterized by second-wave thinkers as a
"failure" of the wave and particle paradigms, as well as the inability of
everyday language to describe an objective reality.96
The wave/particle duality is, in fact, not a limitation on the understanding
of sub-atomic particles by modem physics. Instead, it is a way of describing
newly discovered phenomena in ordinary language. Quantum mechanics is
based on a new type of mathematics which does not describe the world in terms
of particles or waves. 97 When observing and describing sub-atomic
phenomena, in some cases it is helpful to think in terms of waves, and in other
cases of particles. Scientists refer to this as the wave/particle duality, but it is
only a limitation of ordinary language that requires such a label. In fact,
according to quantum mechanics, sub-atomic matter is neither waves nor
particles; it has attributes of both.98
The mathematics developed for the wave/particle nature of matter explains
many of the phenomena of sub-atomic matter. Far from a failure, quantum
theory is "outstandingly successful" and is the basis of much of modem science
and technology. 99 It is difficult to explain the ideas of quantum theory in
everyday language, because the phenomena are not within everyday
experience. Therefore, the wave/particle duality is difficult to describe, not
because of the cultural bias of language,' ° but because the phenomena are
unknown in daily experience. Everyday words to describe sub-atomic
phenomena are not available in any language. Thus, modem linguistics
theories, interesting as they are, do not "make accessible to intellectuals" 10 1 the
insights of modem physics.
The uncertainty principle is the second aspect of quantum theory to
influence the new epistemology.' 0 2 The uncertainty principle has been
popularized into a notion that nothing can be observed or measured without
altering the phenomenon being observed. 10 3 In addition, the uncertainty
principle is said to have done away with predictability.' 04
The uncertainty principle, like quantum theory, was developed to explain a
specific phenomenon associated with physical matter. As Stephen Hawking
95 See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. See also id.
96 Id.
97 S. HAWKING, supra note 7, at 56.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Williams, supra note 6, at 446. See also supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
101 Williams, supra note 6, at 447.
102 Id. at 438.
103 Id. at 438-39.
104 Id. at 437-38.
15831991]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
said, the uncertainty principle is "a fundamental, inescapable property of the
world."105 It is not, however, a universal rule that can be applied to any
phenomenon. The uncertainty principle was developed specifically to explain
phenomena on the sub-atomic scale. Observations made at other scales may or
may not need to take account of a similar principle.1 06
One consequence of the uncertainty principle and quantum mechanics is the
breakdown of Newtonian determinism.' 07 The Laplacian dream of being able
to predict exactly all future events is destroyed by quantum mechanics, because
quantum mechanics does not predict a single definite result for a given
observation.' 0 8 A number of outcomes are possible for any system. 109 Once
again, it is tempting for second-wave thinkers to translate this into a
nonscientific notion that nothing is predictable. Rational, scientific principles, it
might be said, once again have "failed" to provide a predictable universe.
In fact, although quantum theory cannot predict the outcome of a single
observation, it can and does tell accurately how likely a given outcome is. 110 If
a large number of observations are made on systems that start out the same
way, one can predict the approximate number of times the result will be A, the
number of times B, and so on. 11 There is thus an unavoidable element of
chance in an individual event, but the overall pattern of events can be predicted
with great accuracy. Newton's completely deterministic universe is gone, at
least on the sub-atomic level, but it is not accurate to assume the demise of all
predictability based on rational thought.
Statistical uncertainty had been known long before quantum mechanics. In
the late 1700s, Karl Friederich Gauss investigated uncertainty in the context of
astronomical observations. 12 When an astronomer is studying a star, it is
necessary to take several readings of every observation. No matter how precise
the instruments, and how careful the measurement, there is always a scatter in
the data. 13 Gauss took these data and showed that they fall on a bell-shaped
curve. Most scientists simply assume that the "correct" reading is the
average-the center of the curve. Gauss went on to postulate that the scatter
itself tells us that there is an inevitable area of uncertainty for any
observation."14 The uncertainty of any one observation can be calculated by the
105 S. HAWKING, supra note 7, at 55.
106 See infra notes 124-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of scale.
107 S. HAWKiNG, supra note 7, at 55.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 55-56.
111 Id. at56.
112 j. BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 358.
113 Id.
1 14 Id.
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scatter of all similar observations. Thus, the idea of uncertainty in scientific
observation is not new to twentieth-century physics.115
2. Relativity
Another aspect of modem physics that has gained attention from
nonscientists is Einsteinian relativity. 1 6 Einstein postulated that space and time
are not absolute and separate, but form a four-dimensional continuum. 117 The
observation of any event depends entirely on the perspective of the observer.118
Different observers might order events differently if they move with different
velocities relative to the events. Therefore, rather than a firm foundation of
absolute space and time, one might now see the world as bottomless, with no
absolutes. 1 9 This lends credence to an idea of moral or cultural relativism.
What is overlooked by nonscientists is that a type of relativity was known
to Newtonian physicists. It follows directly from Newton's laws that there is no
absolute standard of rest.120 This means that in the Newtonian universe, an
event could not be given an absolute position in space. 121 It was because of the
relativity arising from Newton's laws, together with equations developed by
James Clerk Maxwell, that the idea of an ether was proposed. 122 This led
directly to the Michelson-Morley experiment which prompted Einstein to
postulate that there is no absolute time. 23
However, even though Einsteinian relativity does away with the idea of
absolute time, it does not result in a universe without absolutes. The speed of
light, which had been thought of as relative, is now an absolute. Therefore, it
is inaccurate to think of the Einsteinian universe as completely relativistic;
instead what we hold absolute has changed.
B. Scientific Ptinciples
Several aspects of modem science are often overlooked by second-wave
thinkers and other nonscientists. These concepts bear directly on an
115 Id.
116 Williams, supra note 6, at 437.
117 Id. at 437; S. HAWKING, supra note 7, at 23.
118 j. BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 249.
119 Williams, supra note 6, at 438.
120 S. HAWKING, supra note 7, at 17-18. See also supra note 65 and accompanying
text.
121 Id. at 18.
122 Id. at 19. See also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
123 See also infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of scale and
relativity.
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understanding of physics and its influence on the new epistemology. Three
factors will be discussed below: Scale, tolerance, and process.
1. Scale
The idea of scale might best be illustrated by a story. A professor of
physics comes out of his office at MIT, gets into his car and prepares to drive
home. This particular professor is a world expert in quantum mechanics. In
fact, at the time he comes out of his office on this particular day he understands
the concepts of modem physics better than any man or woman on Earth. The
indeterminacy of electrons, the uncertainty principle, and the charm of quarks
are second nature to him.
The central question is this: How does the professor drive his car? Does
the car have "quantum states" by which either its velocity or its position, but
not both, can be determined? When a highway patrolman uses a radar detector
and bounces a radio wave off the back of the car, will this measurement
irrevocably alter the car and render the measurement of velocity meaningless?
Of course, the answer is no. Cars behave according to Newton's laws, 124
and the professor will be well advised to act accordingly. How can this be?
Modem physics is supposed to have knocked the foundation out from under
Newton forever. Why is it that we are bound by Newtonian laws in everyday
life?
We are bound by Newton's laws because of scale. On the sub-microscopic
level, the atoms making up the car behave according to the principles of
modem physics. A beam of light (or radio waves) aimed at any particular sub-
atomic particle in the car would indeed alter it. The electrons in the atoms
making up the car have quantum states. These effects are real and measurable
in a physics lab, but are so small at the macroscopic level that they are
negligible when considering the interactions of objects such as cars. Even
though the world-view of the scientist might be changed forever by modem
physics, he is forced to behave in everyday life just as he did before.
To carry the analogy to relativity, one might ask how the policeman
observes the professor's car. After all, the measurement of velocity of any
object depends on that object's position in space-time and the position of the
observer in space-time. What appear to be simultaneous events to one observer
124 To say that cars obey Newton's laws is not strictly correct. In fact, Newton's
equations and those of quantum mechanics describe with equal accuracy the behavior of
macroscopic bodies. Because quantum mechanics can account for both the behavior of
macroscopic bodies and sub-atomic phenomena, it is considered to be the "correct" theory.
However, because the equations involved in quantum theory are complex, macroscopic
phenomena are said to obey Newton's laws. The idea that phenomena are different
depending on size is a direct outgrowth of quantum mechanics. See infra note 130 and
accompanying quote.
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may appear to occur at different times to another. 125 More importantly,
relativity tells us that the size of an object varies with its velocity relative to an
observer, and the passage of time varies with an object's velocity relative to an
observer.126 This is the source of the famous "twin paradox." 127
Why does the policeman insist on trying to measure the velocity of the
professor's car in the face of these daunting facts? Why doesn't the professor
argue relativity when faced with a speeding ticket? The answer once again is
scale. Indeed, the size and time of the car vary with its velocity relative to the
policeman.' 28 In order for this effect to become significant, however, the speed
of the moving object must be close to that of the speed of light.' 29 Because
even the most reckless physics professor drives nowhere near 186,000 miles
per second, the relativistic effects are negligible.
Werner Heisenberg recognized the importance of scale in modem physics:
Planck's action quantum, which appears as the characteristic constant in his
law of radiation, does not designate a property of things but a property of
nature. It sets up a scale of measurement and shows that where the encountered
effects are very big... [they] behave differently from the way they do where
they are of atomic size the realm of the Planck constant. Whereas the laws of
Newtonian mechanics were equally valid for all realms of magnitude-the orbit
of the moon around the earth obeying the same laws as the fall of an apple or
the deviation of an alpha particle passing by the nucleus of an atom-Planck's
radiation law for the first time postulated the existence of different scales in
nature and suggested that events in the different realms of magnitude need not
be similar at all. 130
Thus, modem physics itself introduced the idea that events at different
magnitudes need not be similar. Newtonian physics is still taught at universities
because it forms the basis for understanding modem physics and still explains
physical phenomena on a macroscopic scale. 131
2. Tolerance
The word tolerance is offered as an alternative to uncertainty. The idea is
not original here; Jacob Bronowski proposed it in his book The Ascent of
125 Williams, supra note 6, at 438.
126 J. BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 249; S. HAWKING, supra note 7, at 20-21.
127 If one of a set of twins goes on a trip while his brother stays home, the traveller
will return younger than his brother. From the stay-at-home's point of view, time for the
traveller passed much more slowly. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
128 S. HAWKING, supra note 7, at 20-21.
1 2 9 Id.
130 Heisenberg, supra note 56, at 109.
131 See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
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Man. 132 The uncertainty principle by its very name suggests unpredictability.
In fact, the uncertainty principle does not stand for complete unpredictability.
Rather, the principle as formulated by Heisenberg is very precise: the
uncertainty in the position of a particle multiplied by the mass of the particle
must be larger than a quantity known as Planck's constant. 133 That is, the
speed and position of the particle fit together and are confined within a certain
tolerance. 134 This idea can be understood on an everyday level; an object need
not be exactly the same for us to recognize it at different times.' 35 To use
Bronowski's example, the face of a good friend may look different each time
we see it-if it is still "tolerably like," then it is recognizable. 136 An amount of
uncertainty is built into every observation. That uncertainty, however, is not
infinite or even large in comparison with the object or event as a whole.
Observations are uncertain within some tolerance, but the tolerance need not
overwhelm the observation. 137
The idea of tolerance and uncertainty is not new with Heisenberg; Gauss
studied the phenomenon in the 1700s.' 38 What Heisenberg did was to illustrate
that there is uncertainty at the atomic level, and to quantify the tolerance. In a
sense, uncertainty became more predictable, not less. "In science or outside it,
we are not uncertain; our knowledge is merely confined within a certain
tolerance. . . . Science has progressed step by step . .. because it has
understood that the exchange of information between man and nature, and man
and man, can only take place with a certain tolerance." 139 In sum, the
uncertainty principle does not render all observable facts meaningless because
they are hopelessly uncertain. Rather, it provides a way to specify the tolerance
within which one must make any observation.
3. Process
One feature of science has not changed since before the early twentieth
century, even for physicists and astronomers. This is the process by which
science is actually done-the scientific method. 140 The ongoing and interactive
nature of the scientific method is an important factor in understanding science.
132 See supra note 1.
133 S. HAWKING, supra note 7, at 55.
134 j. BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 365.
135 Id.
136 Id.137 Id.
138 See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
139 J. BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 365.
140 S. HAWKING, supra note 7, at 9-13. See also Powell, The Earth's Age and the
Evolution-Creativity Controversy, 1983 OBERLIN ALUMNI MAG. Autumn 1983, at 19
(explanation of the method as applied to the age of the earth and biological evolution).
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An idea, called an hypothesis, is formed to explain a phenomenon of nature.
One or more hypotheses are then tested by observation and experiment, and
altered to accommodate the new information. 141 The altered ideas are then
tested, and altered again. This process can go on for years, decades, even
centuries. Only after considerable testing is an hypothesis characterized as a
theory. Even then, new observations possible because of advances in
technology or ingenious thinking, can partly or wholly discredit a prevailing
theory. Each time a new hypothesis is formed, the scientist's mental picture of
that particular phenomenon is changed. Usually the change is small.
Occasionally the change is enormous, and revolutionizes the way scientists
perceive certain phenomena. 142 Thus Einstein's ideas were not a replacement
of classical physics, but were a refinement, albeit a large one, of Newton's
ideas. As Werner Heisenberg said, "the notions of classical physics provide an
a priori foundation for the investigations of quantum physics, since we can
carry out experiments in the atomic field only with the aid of concepts from
classical physics." 143 Thus even though the conclusions of modem physics may
be radically different from those of classical physics, the process by which
physics is done, the scientific method, is essentially the same.
C. Physics and Legal Theory
"Stop telling God what to do."
-Niels Bohr' 44
Science is the process by which man explores the universe. Law, on the
other hand, is the process by which man governs himself and involves the
distribution of power and human rights. Society, at least on some level, can
control the process and the results of law, but not the results of science. For
these reasons, no strict analogy between science and law is possible. This
section, however, proposes that some concepts from science can be used to
explain aspects of the law in a new way. The process of science has not been
stopped or discredited by the discovery that the laws of science are not
absolute. The thesis of this section is that the law need not be discredited nor
stopped by the discovery that the rule of law is not absolute.
141 For the classic paper on multiple working hypotheses in science, and a description
of the use of hypotheses in general, see Chamberlin, The Methwd of Multiple Working
Hypotheses, 148 SCIENCE 754 (1965), reprintedfrom 15 SCIENCE (old series) 92 (1890).
142 See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCrURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
1970).
143 Heisenberg, supra note 56, at 111.
144 j. BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 256. This is Bohr's retort to Einstein's famous
quote; see supra note 1 and accompanying quote.
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1. Determinacy
a. Tolerance
We have seen that indeterminacy in science does not imply complete
unpredictability. Instead, natural phenomena are predictable within a certain
tolerance. The irrationalist CRITs, such as Singer, charge that determinacy is
central to traditional legal thought, but that in fact laws are largely
indeterminate. This section proposes a middle ground for the law that
incorporates a principle of tolerance similar to that in science.
Singer mentions the idea that legal rules may narrow choice within
boundaries, but not tell us what to do inside the boundaries. He contends that
within such boundaries, law is nondirective. 145 This is very similar to an idea
of a tolerance within the law. Singer and all legal theorists concentrate on the
areas of ambiguity "inside the boundaries," because those areas lead to the
appellate opinions that form the basis of most legal literature. The vast majority
of laws, as they affect our everyday lives, are not nearly as ambiguous. This
part of the law is virtually ignored by most legal theorists, including CRITs.
The law seems indeterminate to CRITs because of concentration by judges and
legal theorists on areas of ambiguity.
A concept of tolerance within the law can take several forms. Some
tolerance is built in-uncertainty that cannot be eliminated. This involves limits
set by the physical world on the operation of law. Other tolerances are built
deliberately into the system. This includes areas of discretion that judges or
legislatures purposely insert into the operation of law. Finally, although
uncertainty within a certain tolerance in the law cannot give us a definitive
answer for a given case, it may allow us to predict the likelihood of a given
outcome over a large number of cases.
Some areas of the law are not uncertain, although not completely
determinate. For instance, citizens are aware in general of what is legal and
what is not in their everyday experience. Running a red light is illegal;
stopping for a red light is not. Even traffic laws, however, are not strictly
determinate-some tolerance exists. For instance, if a car pulls into an
intersection just as the light turns red, is that illegal? Exactly when does it
become illegal? This is when a certain tolerance comes in; the motorist (and the
police officer who is watching) must use some judgment in deciding whether it
is illegal.
Even though there is some judgment in every legal issue, it may be
impossible to predict exactly what the tolerance is or how big it is. The police
officer may give some motorists more tolerance than others, and different
police officers may have different boundaries for the tolerance. Race, gender,
145 Singer, supra note 11, at 19.
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or other political bias may play a role in the decision. The tolerance can be
widened and narrowed to some extent, but not done away with altogether. This
is because of the way the world outside of law works. It is simply impossible
for human beings to set up a system that is absolutely accurate about when a
motorist runs a red light and when he does not.
In most cases, however, the motorist knows to stop for the red light. It is
only when he is "close to the edge" that we are in the area of tolerance, and the
law has a high potential for political outcomes. In fact, citizens know quite well
in general when they are following the law and when they are not. People are
also aware of the tolerance allowed them in many situations. Most drivers
know approximately how much above the speed limit they can go before the
highway patrol will stop them; this is the tolerance given by the authorities to
take into account inaccuracies in the speed testing equipment and in motorists'
speedometers.
Although some tolerance is caused by unpredictable application of laws,
some tolerance is deliberately built into rules that could otherwise be more
determinate. The ambiguity caused by this type of tolerance is not only known
to "liberals," but is openly acknowledged. It is well known that the discretion
given judges and juries results in some decisions that are racially or politically
based. The advantages of flexibility are often considered to outweigh the
disadvantages of indeterminacy. An example of this type of tolerance is
embodied in Justice Powell's opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp regarding racial
bias in the application of capital punishment:
There is, of course, some risk of racial prejudice influencing a jury's decision
in a criminal case. ... The question "is at what point that risk becomes
constitutionally unacceptable[.I"
McCleskey's argument that the Constitution condemns the discretion
allowed decisionmakers in the Georgia capital sentencing system is antithetical
to the fundamental role of discretion in our criminal justice system. Discretion
in the criminal justice system offers substantial benefits to the criminal
defendant. . . Of course, "the power to be lenient [also] is the power to
discriminate," but a capital-punishment system that did not allow for
discretionary acts of leniency "would be totally alien to our notions of criminal
justice."146
Singer contends that legal principles are not determinate, at least in part,
when they are not "directive"-that is when they do not "help us choose
among alternative possible rules." 147 One of the reasons suggested for
nondirectiveness is ambiguity. For example, rules such as "be fair" do not tell
146 481 U.S. 279, 308, 311-12 (1987) (statistically shown racial bias in application of
capital punishment not sufficient to render death sentence unconstitutional) (citations
omitted).
147 Singer, supra note 11, at 18.
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us what the outcome will be in a given case. Nevertheless, Justice Powell, fully
aware of the ambiguity in his approach, chose to insert discretion into the
capital punishment scheme. In fact, the Court in another case struck down
mandatory death sentencing-a considerably more determinate policy-in favor
of the "particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and
record of each. . . defendant." 148 This area of tolerance is purposely put into
the law because of the perceived benefits of flexibility and discretion to the
defendant and to society. Death penalty doctrine "outside the boundaries" is
not ambiguous, however; capital punishment is clearly permitted for some
offenses, and clearly not for others.
It is often undesirable to have determinacy without some tolerance. For
example, imagine a scheme of mandatory sentencing that is completely
determinate, with no tolerance. Such a scheme may, for instance, mandate that
any adult convicted of possession of a certain quantity of a drug be sentenced to
five years imprisonment. This means that an eighteen-year-old first offender
would get the same sentence as a hardened drug dealer. If we wish to have any
system to resolve disputes, some tolerance is necessary. How else are we to
"prevent cruelty?" 149
Singer suggests yet another area that could be called tolerance within the
law. He contends that judges act as if the choice of rules is severely restricted,
even though it is really infinite. Singer uses the example of injury caused by
faulty auto repairs. 150 He points to alternatives to the traditional solutions of
negligence and strict liability, such as universal auto insurance and mass transit.
For judges, however, the choice of rules is usually restricted, even in cases of
first impression. Mandating universal insurance and abolishing cars in favor of
subways are indeed possibilities, but not possibilities usually open to the judge.
Singer ignores the difference in choice of rules between judicial decisionmaking
and legislative decisionmaking.
Because there is some limit on the number of choices that a judge has when
deciding a case, even the area of tolerance in judicial decisionmaking is not
entirely uncertain. Just as with quantum mechanics, one may not be able to
predict the outcome of a given case, but when a large number of cases are
decided, the choices are restricted and some probability of an outcome can be
determined.
When tolerance is allowed or inserted into the law, its scope, and how it
may cause gender, race, and other hierarchical bias are matters to be
considered by society. Within tolerance, however, the law cannot be made to
"tell us what to do." 151 It is effectively impossible in the law, as it is in
science, to be completely determinate. Within the boundaries of the tolerance,
148 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
149 Singer, supra note 11, at 67.
150 Id. at 15.
151 Id. at 19.
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there must be flexibility. This does not mean, however, that we are uncertain
or ambiguous about all of the law, or that the law is completely indeterminate.
b. Scale
The concept of certainty with a relatively small area of tolerance does not
cover all laws. Some bodies of law are much less deterministic than others.
Thus, a concept of scale plays a part in some areas of the law. For example,
when a driver is stopped for a traffic violation, but the encounter escalates into
an unrelated search for drug possession, we move into a different area or
"scale" of law. The traffic violation itself may fall into the category of laws
that are reasonably determinate, within a principle of tolerance. In contrast, the
search may fall within an area that is governed by principles that are more
indeterminate. The best examples of such principles are constitutional
doctrines. Constitutional doctrines are not as clear as ordinary rules of law, and
often difficult to apply in specific cases. Decisions in this area are more likely
to be motivated by cultural and political bias.
The difference between traffic laws and constitutional principles is roughly
analogous to the idea of scale. So long as an event remains within an area of
law that is reasonably determinate, such as the traffic laws, the indeterminate
political and hierarchical bias of the law is insignificant. At the point the event
crosses the boundary into an area that is governed by more indeterminate
principles, it has entered a different scale of the law.
Singer points out that rules at varying levels of generality can cause
indeterminacy.15 2 He contends that there is always an overriding principle that
can trump the most determinate of laws. 153 This does not happen, however,
unless an event has passed into an area governed by "larger scale" issues of
law. Einstein's laws always apply to the behavior of physical bodies; it is just
that Newton's laws describe that behavior equally well and much more simply
at low velocities. It is only when the speed of light is approached that it is
necessary to invoke the new physics. Similarly, "larger" issues of law may be
present in more determinate areas of law, but they are not significant to the
outcome until the event passes into the "larger scale" of the law. 154
2. Objectivity
The scientific method does not guarantee an absolute "objective" reality.
Instead, it provides a system for refining hypotheses. Modem physics has
shown that the laws of nature cannot define an occurrence at the sub-
152 Id. at 17.
153 Id. at 22.
154 See also supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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microscopic scale, but can only define the probability of such an occurrence.
This does not mean, however, that all reality is lost. As Heisenberg said:
One can interpret the probability waves of the Bohr-Kramers-Slater theory as a
quantitative rehabilitation of the concept of dynamics, of potentiality, or of the
later Latin concept of potentia in the Aristotelian philosophy. A decisive role is
played in this philosophy by the idea that events are not necessarily determined
but that the possibility of or tendency toward an occurrence constitutes a kind
of reality-an intermediate layer of reality situated halvay between the bulky
reality of matter and the spiritual reality of the idea or picture. This idea has
won a new place for itself in modem quantum physics, and the possibility for
the mathematical formulation of natural laws. 155
Within the law there is also an "intermediate" layer of reality. Singer
proposes that we make decisions by "having conversations"; 156 and yet he has
shown that conversations often lead nowhere.157 In order to come up with the
solution to a problem, at some point we must stop conversing and decide. In
order to stop conversing and start deciding, we must assume a basis on which
to found our decision. This basis may be a tendency, a possibility, a potentia,
rather than an outside or purely objective foundation.
Heisenberg wrestled with this problem in the context of physics:
Here again we are brought up sharply before the rock-bottom truth that in
science we are not dealing with nature itself but with the science of nature-
that is, with a nature which has been thought through and described by man.
This is not to introduce an element of subjectivity into science, for it is in no
way asserted that events in the world of nature depend on our observation of
them; it is simply to say that science stands between man and nature and that
we cannot renounce the application of concepts that have been intuitively given
to or are inborn in man.158
The consequence of Heisenberg's idea is that we are trapped within our own
reality. The scientist knows that the reality he works with every day is filtered
through a human brain. 159 But there is no choice. If the scientist is to know the
world, it is the only way in which it can be explored.
Similarly, the judge must filter the law through his own human brain. The
judge may be, and should be, aware of the possibility of cultural bias in making
a decision, but the decision must be made. He tries to find rules and principles
155 Heisenberg, supra note 56, at 110 (emphasis added).
156 Singer, supra note 11, at 62, 65.
15 7 Id. at 38-39.
158 Heisenberg, supra note 56, at 112 (emphasis added).
159 Ultimately, even the idea that observations are a result of the observer, or that
perception is a result of culture, is culturally and humanly based.
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that are as objective as possible-that represent potentia. A good judge does the
best he can, but at some point the judge is trapped in his own reality, just as the
scientist is. He is dealing with law that has been "thought through and
described by man." That does not invalidate the judge's endeavor, any more
than the scientist's. If we are to "prevent cruelty," to "alleviate misery," and to
"alter the social conditions that cause loneliness," 160 we must start somewhere.
Singer asserts that a substantive foundation for law must be described
accurately for it to be genuine, and that the usual sources for a substantive
foundation are too general to describe it accurately. 161 I propose that accuracy
in the description of legal foundation is like accuracy in science; some Gaussian
scatter always exists. It is impossible to be one hundred percent accurate. This
does not invalidate science, nor should it invalidate law.
There are two ways in which a tendency or possibility can give us an
intermediate reality in the law. The first has to do with laws that are created for
practical reasons. For example, it is necessary to have traffic regulations to
prevent accidents and deaths. There may be no objectively rational reason or
God-given foundation to drive on the right as opposed to the left, or to have
red lights rather than blue ones. It is sensible, however, to have some system
on which everyone agrees, or else great suffering will result. Thus, a law may
not be ultimately grounded in some transcendental foundation, and yet have an
intermediate reality that gives it rationality.
The second type of intermediate reality is the process of law that can be
roughly analogized to scientific process. The process of both judicial or
common law and legislative "experimentation" allows us to refine laws. If
society permits and encourages it, the process can be corrective in nature. Does
this process make the law "right" in a fundamental sense? No, but, it can form
the intermediate reality of a body of rules that are used when they work and are
changed when they cease to make sense. This is not to say that the process is
perfect, or that the rules always produce desirable outcomes. Society must
make the process more accessible to groups and individuals who have no access
now. The process of the scientific method continues, even though the results
we get may be startling, and cause us to question the foundations of our
thinking. Similarly, the legal process continues to be used, even though the
results may cause us to question the rationality of the law. 162 If we are to know
the world and govern ourselves, we must work with what we have.
160 Singer, supra note 11, at 67-69.
161 Id. at 29-30.
162 See supra note 143 and text immediately following.
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3. Neutrality
Singer's view of traditional legal theory includes a concept of neutrality. 163
The two claims embodied in this concept are the relativistic notions that
individuals should be allowed their own vision of "freedom and the good life,"
and that limits to freedom should be based on independent principles that do
not presuppose a concept of good. 164 In these two claims, Singer sees a series
of dichotomies that he claims "liberals" use to divide the world. 165
Singer's dichotomies can be analogized to the famous "wave/particle"
duality in quantum mechanics. One such dichotomy is the subjective/objective
split. In law we think of a standard as being objective if it is general-what
would a reasonable person think in this situation? A subjective standard is one
that is individualized-what did this person think? The concepts, however, are
not mutually exclusive. Objectivity, of necessity, contains some subjective
element. A reasonable person in the mind of a juror is what that juror sees as
reasonable. Subjectivity also contains some element of objectivity. A person's
subjective thought cannot be known entirely by another; some element of
common experience must take part in the standard.
Singer claims that the dichotomies such as the objective/subjective split are
no longer useful. 166 However, it may be useful to think of some concepts in
terms of dichotomies, just as scientists think of sub-atomic phenomena in terms
of a wave/particle duality. Quantum mechanics transcends the wave/particle
duality. Scientists know that sub-atomic phenomena do not really have such a
duality, but they use it to describe and think about phenomena. Similarly, we
may think of legal concepts in terms of dichotomies, even though we know
them to be artificial, because they help us think and describe what we mean.
We have seen that Einsteinian relativity is not really more relative than the
Newtonian concept of relativity; only that concepts of time, rather than
scientific laws, are not absolute. The absolute has not been abolished. Time is
no longer an absolute, instead the speed of light is absolute.
An analogous concept in law is the "liberal" vision of "freedom and the
good life." 167 This concept must encompass some moral and political stand
against a view that does not recognize individuality. This is the absolute that
allows a legal concept that is otherwise relativistic. It may be that we should, as
a society, re-examine what we hold as absolute. Traditional legal theory may
indeed justify hierarchies, but not because of an incomplete relativism.
Complete relativism in law is as impossible as it is in science. Instead, the
163 Singer, supra note 11, at 40.
164 Id.
165 Id.
1 6 6 I1. at 46.
167 Id. at 40-41.
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wrong principles may be held as absolutes. 168 The criticisms of traditional law
made by CRITs might lead us to discover new principles to hold absolute, in
order to abandon the old ones to relativity. But as Einstein showed us,
relativity is impossible without some principle that is absolute.
V. CONCLUSION
A professor of law comes out of his office at Harvard, gets into his car and
prepares to drive home. This particular professor is an irrationalist CRIT. He
understands the concepts of nihilism and its relationship to traditional legal
theory better than any man or woman on Earth. Ideas of determinacy,
neutrality, and objectivity in the law hold no sway with him. He also knows
that there are other cars, red lights, and policemen on the city streets.
The central question is this: How does the professor drive his car?
Elise Porter
168 We may, of course, hypocritically claim to hold one thing as an absolute while in
reality using another concept as a basis for decision.
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